INDIA’S FOREIGN POLICY DISTORTIONS
Dr. Subhash Kapila
Aug. 13, -S.A.A.G.
Introductory Observations
The Indian Republic in the first fifty years of its existence maintained a strategic autonomy in the conduct of its foreign policy despite a much more limited national power profile and economic profile than that exists today.
Today, when India is economically vibrant and strong and India has been able to amass sizeable conventional and strategic assets, India to its citizens seems strategically tied down in adding muscle to the conduct of its foreign policy.
Adding muscle to India’s foreign policy does not imply war mongering or military adventurism. Adding muscle to India’s foreign policy implies that India’s national security interests are accorded a paramountcy in the conduct of foreign policies to the exclusion of the personal predictions of the Indian Prime Minister and his proximate foreign policy advisors. It also implies the existence of political will to secure India’s national security interests.
The period 2004-2009 has witnessed a bartering away of India’s national security interests. This trend stands examined in the Author’s SAAG Paper No.3210 dated 22 May 2009 entitled “India’s Foreign Policy 2004-2009: The Wasted Years:
The major part of India’s foreign policy failures in this time span and the distortions that willingly or unwillingly have seeped into India’s foreign policy (2004 – 2009) have resulted from policies or lack of policies generated by the predominance given by India’s current Prime Minister to the “United States Factor” in our policy formulations.
Co-attendant with the primacy given to the “United States Factor” in India’s foreign policy formulations during 2004-2009 has been the “parallel track” of “Pakistan-appeasement policies” out of deference to United States Pak-centric strategic sensitivities.
In the process, India can be said to have abdicated its much prized “strategic autonomy” (not to be confused with non-alignment) in its foreign policy formulations. In another sense, it can also be said that India has diluted its aspirations to become a global power.
The center of gravity of the global balance of power has shifted to Asia. India along with China are the two prominent stakeholders and determinants of this shift in the balance of power.
While China has leveraged this shift to her advantage, India’s foreign policies has not leveraged this shift in India’s favor. On the contrary, India’s current foreign policy has led it to seemingly emerge as more of a United States satellite or camp follower.
Rhetorical flourishes by United States political leaders and officials will not impart global power status on India. India has to earn its global power status by standing firmly on its own legs, build its strengths and demonstrate its strategic autonomy globally and regionally, and firmly demonstrate fortified by Indian nationalism, that it has the will to use power to secure India’s national interests.
This point is contextually relevant to the examination of the impact on India’s foreign policy formulations of the “United States Factor”.
This Paper intends to examine the main theme under the following heads:
The “United States Factor” in India’s Foreign Policy (2004-2009): No End Gains
Indian Prime Minister’s “Foreign Policy Romanticism” with United States Reminiscent of Nehru’s Romanticism with China.
Peace with Pakistan: An Elusive Mythical Obsession of India’s Prime Minister
China’s Containment was Implicit in Evolution of US-India Strategic Relationship: United States Now Shirks from it
1) The “United States Factor” in India’s Foreign Policy (2004-2009): No End Gains
The US-India Strategic Partnership much hyped in 2000-2001, including by this Author, now stands reduced to a “strategic relationship” only. That too is alive only in South Block corridors.
India’s expectant hopes attending the advent of evolving a US-India Strategic Partnership focused on multiple aims. At the core of these aims were (1) India’s rise to global power status with a US impetus (2) Strategic downsizing of Pakistan and limiting its “spoiler-state” role in South Asia (3) Joint US-India convergence in coping and managing of the growing military rise of China.
Post 9/11 and now Post Af-Pak Policy unveiling it should be clear to all right thinking Indians that the United States global and regional agenda in South Asia is not in consonance with India’s strategic expectations from the United States. The United States agenda is in contradiction to India’s national security interests and India’s national aspirations.
India’s supine foreign policies during 2004-2009 in accommodating United States strategic sensitivities “at all costs” has landed India in a position where there are “no end-gains” for India by according a primacy to the “US Factor” in India foreign policy formulation.
The above assertions stand fortified by the following manifestations:
Proximity to United States has not contributed to lessening of India’s threat perceptions emanating from Pakistan and China. United States has not contributed at all in this direction.
United States strangulating hold over Pakistan has not been exercised to prevent Pakistan’s proxy war and terrorism against India nor has the United States diluted the Pakistan-China strategic nexus
United States till today has not supported India’s candidature for the United Nations Security Council as a Permanent Member. It indicates US reservations on the emergence of India as a global power.
United States has revived or shortly will revive pressures that indirectly aim at capping/rolling back India’s nuclear weapons arsenal.
Strategically, the United States has only conceded the vast empty expanse of the Indian Ocean to India to extend its influence. The United States has not conceded that India is the predominant regional power in South Asia and that Pakistan must adjust its delusionary strategic mindsets accordingly.
Increased Indo-US military-to-military contacts are no index of a thriving US-India Strategic Partnership. One is now constrained to term it as a US-India Strategic Relationship. The United States has held itself back from adding enhanced strategic and political contours to the US-India relationship.
The most striking deduction from the above analysis is that India’s foreign policy (2004-2009) has been strategically misconceived and ill-advised in making the “United States as the “Central Pillar” of India’s foreign policy.”
2) Indian Prime Minister’s “Foreign Policy Romanticism” with United States Reminiscent of Nehru’s Romanticism with China
One would not be far wrong to term the Indian Prime Minister’s “Foreign Policy Romanticism” with the United States as reminiscent of Nehru’s similar romanticism with China. The results of the later were a great military setback for India.
It is not to suggest that the United States will attack India like China did. But an Indian monochromatic foreign policy focused on United States has brought distortions in India’s present foreign policies, foreclosing many of its wider options afield, particularly India foreign policy towards Pakistan.
Military setbacks can accrue to India by United States continued military build-up of Pakistan and thereby affecting the India-Pakistan Military Balance. It is strategically strange that while the United States increasingly harps on the strengths of its Strategic Partnership with India, it concurrently keeps building Pakistan’s conventional military capabilities. Even a non-commissioned officer of the Indian Army would point out that it is a puerile US argument that it’s provision of combat fighter aircraft and long range maritime surveillance aircraft fitted with anti-submarine weapons to Pakistan are intended for augmenting Pakistan’s anti-terrorism warfare capability.
The Indian Prime Minister has failed in his foreign policy approaches to the United States to demand strategic ‘quid-pro-quos’ from the United States in relation to the adjustments and compromises he has made in Indian foreign policies to accommodate US strategic interests on Pakistan.
3) Peace with Pakistan: An Elusive Mythical Obsession of India’s Prime Minister
Peace with Pakistan is a desirable objective for India’s foreign policy. But the timing of peace and resumption of composite dialogue with Pakistan has to be decided by India’s assessments and readings of the contextual security environment and India’s national security interests.
The timings of such a process cannot be dictated by the United States to synchronize with the timings of its strategic overtures to Pakistan to serve US strategic interests. It does not require much imagination for anyone to assert that the United States and India have serious strategic divergences over Pakistan.
Additionally, has the Indian Prime Minister and his advisory team ever asked themselves the question as to why the United States constantly preaches to India on peace with Pakistan?
India despite repetitive Pakistani acts of terrorism against India has exercised restraint. Even today India stands aloof and strategically not taken advantage of the growing civil war within Pakistan. Then why does the United States resort to peace sermons to India on India-Pak peace knowing fully well that these need to be given to Pakistan only.
Further, in the past, and even now, Kashmir- mention is used as a strategic pressure point against India by US political leaders.
Sharm-al- Sheikh was a direct manifestation of the “distortions” that the “United States Factor” has induced in India’s current foreign policy formulation. The Havana Agreement 2006 was the earlier manifestation.
In both cases the “Indian foreign policy troika” of the Prime Minister, the National Security Adviser and the Foreign Secretary were the moving spirits behind these infamous appeasement concessions on terrorism to Pakistan, acting in duress under US pressures.
Does it behave a country of India’s size and potential to succumb to external pressures?
Fortunately, the force of Indian public opinion pressured the Congress President to make the Indian Prime Minister to retract from Sharm-al-Sheikh concessions to Pakistan. That does not lessen the gravity of the Indian policy establishment succumbing to external pressures especially over Pakistan.
Peace with Pakistan will continue to be an elusive myth till such time some Indian political leader emerges who can recognize that the only way to restrain Pakistan is to follow the US model against Russia in the Cold War.
Further peace with Pakistan will accrue when Indian Prime Ministers ensure that India’s war preparedness at all times is so high that coupled with Indian Prime Ministers demonstrating the will to use power, these two realities existentially deter Pakistan from provoking India and indulging in military adventurism against it..
Indian Prime Ministers down the line have not grasped the fundamentals of why peace with Pakistan will remain an elusive myth. The onus of bringing about India- Pakistan peace lies squarely on United States shoulders and not on India's shoulders.
The United States has consistently invented and re-invented Pakistan’s strategic utility for US national security interests. Pursuant to this fixation it has armed and re-armed Pakistan substantially and encouraged it to box much above its strategic weight.
Peace with Pakistan will therefore continue to be elusive till such time United States re-calibrates its South Asia policies with Pakistan removed from the centrality it occupies in US strategy.
4) China’s Containment was Implicit in Evolution of US-India Strategic Relationship: United States Now Shirks from It
Democracy and shared values were not the bed-rock of the advent of US-India’s Strategic Partnership. The bedrock of this evolving strategic relationship was an implicit understanding and strategic convergence that China’s rising military power needed to be contained for mutual strategic benefits.
American strategic literature of the preceding decade and even in this decade is alive with discussions to this end.
The American stress on joint exercises and enter-operability with the Indian Armed Forces was surely not for disaster management purposes. The underlying intent has surely been a possible China contingency.
Recent and latest United States foreign policy trends indicate that the United States is no longer imbued with a China containment strategy. Nothing could be more blasphemous for Indian ears than the latest US proposal of a G-2 (US and China) combine to control global affairs. The underlying content is not only economic but also a strategic compromise that the United States seems to be making with China.
Further, India’s Prime Minister and his team are seemingly unaware that it is a cardinal tenet of United States strategic policies that no single Asian nation emerges as the predominant power. To that end United States would continue to play more of a role of a “balancer” rather than side with India to offset China’s military rise.
India’s Foreign Policy Options (2004-2009) Foreclosed by “United States Factor” Primacy
India will now begin to strategically pay for its foreign policies or lack of foreign policies during the period 2001-2009 arising from giving a misplaced primacy to the “United States Factor” in its foreign policy formulations.
In respect of India’s main threat adversaries, namely Pakistan and China, India’s foreign policy options stand foreclosed because of the “US Factor”.
The Indian Prime Minister with all his proximity to the United State has failed to prevail and convince the United States to restrain Pakistan’s proxy war and terrorism against India.
Contrarily, the Indian Prime Minister is being pressurized to suffer Pakistan’s intransigence for the cause of greater American strategic good.
The United States constantly changing priorities in its foreign policy stances towards China makes it an unreliable partner of India to deal with its China threat.
In relation to Pakistan, the close relations of India with Iran were a counter weight. In relation to China, the longstanding Russia-India Strategic Partnership was an effective counter-balance and restraint.
According primacy to the “United States Factor” in India’s foreign policies during the period 2004-2009 led to a strategic downgrading of India’s foreign policy priorities towards Iran and Russia. Earnest hard work would be required now to resurrect these relationships.
With aspirations to emerge as a global power, India’s foreign policy cannot be converted into a US-centric mode. If the United States resorts to “balancing” India by use of Pakistan and/or China then Indian political leaders must learn to ‘balance’ the United States with an equally strong strategic partnership with Russia.
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh for years did not attend the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Summit meetings. It sent wrong signals to Russia.
In the same vein it needs to be pointed out that this Government should desist from making India’s military inventories totally reliant on the United States. There is a danger that this Government for political reasons may place the multi-billion dollar order for 126 combat fighter aircraft for the Indian Air Force on the United States. By such a decision, in one single stroke, India would be mortgaging the cutting edge of India’s offensive capabilities to the mercy of a Pak-centric United States.
5) Concluding Observations
In earlier Papers of this Author a point that repeatedly stands made is that India cannot afford to emerge as a global player despite the United States or in opposition to it.
The opposite is also true that no global power has ever helped another aspiring power to emerge as a global power. This stands true for the United States and India too.
The United States may, and one repeats may, assist India to emerge as a “global player” but it will never assist India to emerge as a “global power” on equal terms with USA.
The years 2004-2009 have been “wasted years” in terms of India’s foreign policy formulations and its conduct. The overwhelming reason was that India’s foreign policy troika” comprising the PM, NSA and the Foreign Secretary made the United States as the “Central Pillar” of India’s foreign policy.
The resultant effect was that India stood disconnected from its proven traditional friendly partners.
It is high time, that with no end- gains having accrued from such foreign policy fixations, India’s foreign policy is re-calibrated and strong connectivities re-established with India’s proven friends.
An aspiring global power like India needs to have multiple foreign policy connectivities to provide flexibility of options.
India’s Prime Ministers need to emulate China. If the United States today talks of a global G-2 combine of USA and China to manage global affairs, it is because China has followed the dictum of a “mailed fist in a velvet glove.” and leveraged its national strengths to propel its rise on the global stage.
(The author is an International Relations and Strategic Affairs analyst. He is the Consultant, Strategic Affairs with South Asia Analysis Group. Email: drsubhashkapila.007@gmail.com)
US Perfidy & Singh @ http://www.organiser.org/dynamic/modules.php?name=Content&pa=showpage&pid=301&page=14
Source: http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers34/paper3355.html
Showing posts with label INDIA. Show all posts
Showing posts with label INDIA. Show all posts
Friday, August 14, 2009
Wednesday, January 7, 2009
** The Next World Order
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/02/opinion/02das.html?_r=2&th&emc=th
The Next World Order
By GURCHARAN DAS
January 1, 2009
CHINA and India are in a struggle for a top rung on the ladder ofworld power, but their approaches to the state and to power could notbe more different.
Two days after last month's terrorist attack on Mumbai, I met with aChinese friend who was visiting India on business. He was shocked as much by the transparent and competitive minute-by-minute reporting ofthe attack by India's dozens of news channels as by the ineffectualresponse of the government. He had seen a middle-class housewife onnational television tell a reporter that the Indian commandos delayedin engaging the terrorists because they were too busy guarding political big shots. He asked how the woman could get away with such astatement.
I explained sarcasm resonates in a nation that is angry and disappointed with its politicians.
My friend switched the subject to the poor condition of India's roads, its dilapidated cities and theconstant blackouts. Suddenly, he stopped and asked: "With all this,how did you become the second-fastest growing economy in the world?China's leaders fear the day when India's government will get its acttogether."
The answer to his question may lie in a common saying among Indians that "our economy grows at night when the government is asleep."
As if to illustrate this, the Mumbai stock market rose in the period after the terrorist attacks. Two weeks later, in several state elections,incumbents were ousted over economic issues, not security.
All this baffled my Chinese friend, and undoubtedly many of hiscountrymen, whose own success story has been scripted by an efficient state. They are uneasy because their chief ally, Pakistan, is consistently linked to terrorism while across the border India's economy keeps rising disdainfully. It puzzles them that the anger in India over the Mumbai attacks is directed against Indian politicians rather than Muslims or Pakistan.
The global financial crisis has definitely affected India's growth,and it will be down to perhaps 7 percent this year from 8.7 percent in2007. According to my friend, China is hurting even more. What really perplexes the Chinese, he said, is that scores of nations have engaged in the same sorts of economic reforms as India, so why is it that it'sthe Indian economy that has become the developing world's second best? The speed with which India is creating world-class companies is also ashock to the Chinese, whose corporate structure is based onstate-owned and foreign companies.
I have no satisfactory explanation for all this, but I think it mayhave something to do with India's much-reviled caste system. Vaishyas,members of the merchant caste, who have learned over generations how to accumulate capital, give the nation a competitive advantage.Classical liberals may be right in thinking that commerce is a natural trait, but it helps if there is a devoted group of risk-takingentrepreneurs around to take advantage of the opportunity. Notsurprisingly, Vaishyas still dominate the Forbes list of Indianbillionaires.
In a much-discussed magazine article last year, Lee Kwan Yew, the former prime minister of Singapore, raised an important question: Why does the rest of the world view China's rise as a threat but India'sas a wonderful success story?
The answer is that India is a vast,unwieldy, open democracy ruled by a coalition of 20 parties. It is evolving through a daily flow of ideas among the conservative forcesof caste and religion, the liberals who dominate intellectual life,and the new forces of global capitalism.
The idea of becoming a military power in the 21st century embarrasses many Indians. This ambivalence goes beyond Mahatma Gandhi's nonviolentstruggle for India's freedom, or even the Buddha's message of peace.
The skeptical Indian temper goes back to the 3,500-year-old "Nasadiya"verse of the Rig Veda, which meditates on the creation of theuniverse: "Who knows and who can say, whence it was born and whencecame this creation? The gods are later than this world's creation. Who knows then whence it first came into being?" When you have millions of gods, you cannot afford to be theologically narcissistic. It also makes you suspect power.
Both the Chinese and the Indians are convinced that their prosperity will only increase in the 21st century. In China it will be induced by the state; in India's case, it may well happen despite the state.
Indians expect to continue their relentless march toward a modern,democratic, market-based future. In this, terrorist attacks are anoisy, tragic, but ultimately futile sideshow.
However, Indians are painfully aware that they must reform their government bureaucracy, police and judiciary — institutions,paradoxically, they were so proud of a generation ago. When thathappens, India may become formidable, a thought that undoubtedlyworries China's leaders.
Gurcharan Das is the author of "India Unbound."
The Next World Order
By GURCHARAN DAS
January 1, 2009
CHINA and India are in a struggle for a top rung on the ladder ofworld power, but their approaches to the state and to power could notbe more different.
Two days after last month's terrorist attack on Mumbai, I met with aChinese friend who was visiting India on business. He was shocked as much by the transparent and competitive minute-by-minute reporting ofthe attack by India's dozens of news channels as by the ineffectualresponse of the government. He had seen a middle-class housewife onnational television tell a reporter that the Indian commandos delayedin engaging the terrorists because they were too busy guarding political big shots. He asked how the woman could get away with such astatement.
I explained sarcasm resonates in a nation that is angry and disappointed with its politicians.
My friend switched the subject to the poor condition of India's roads, its dilapidated cities and theconstant blackouts. Suddenly, he stopped and asked: "With all this,how did you become the second-fastest growing economy in the world?China's leaders fear the day when India's government will get its acttogether."
The answer to his question may lie in a common saying among Indians that "our economy grows at night when the government is asleep."
As if to illustrate this, the Mumbai stock market rose in the period after the terrorist attacks. Two weeks later, in several state elections,incumbents were ousted over economic issues, not security.
All this baffled my Chinese friend, and undoubtedly many of hiscountrymen, whose own success story has been scripted by an efficient state. They are uneasy because their chief ally, Pakistan, is consistently linked to terrorism while across the border India's economy keeps rising disdainfully. It puzzles them that the anger in India over the Mumbai attacks is directed against Indian politicians rather than Muslims or Pakistan.
The global financial crisis has definitely affected India's growth,and it will be down to perhaps 7 percent this year from 8.7 percent in2007. According to my friend, China is hurting even more. What really perplexes the Chinese, he said, is that scores of nations have engaged in the same sorts of economic reforms as India, so why is it that it'sthe Indian economy that has become the developing world's second best? The speed with which India is creating world-class companies is also ashock to the Chinese, whose corporate structure is based onstate-owned and foreign companies.
I have no satisfactory explanation for all this, but I think it mayhave something to do with India's much-reviled caste system. Vaishyas,members of the merchant caste, who have learned over generations how to accumulate capital, give the nation a competitive advantage.Classical liberals may be right in thinking that commerce is a natural trait, but it helps if there is a devoted group of risk-takingentrepreneurs around to take advantage of the opportunity. Notsurprisingly, Vaishyas still dominate the Forbes list of Indianbillionaires.
In a much-discussed magazine article last year, Lee Kwan Yew, the former prime minister of Singapore, raised an important question: Why does the rest of the world view China's rise as a threat but India'sas a wonderful success story?
The answer is that India is a vast,unwieldy, open democracy ruled by a coalition of 20 parties. It is evolving through a daily flow of ideas among the conservative forcesof caste and religion, the liberals who dominate intellectual life,and the new forces of global capitalism.
The idea of becoming a military power in the 21st century embarrasses many Indians. This ambivalence goes beyond Mahatma Gandhi's nonviolentstruggle for India's freedom, or even the Buddha's message of peace.
The skeptical Indian temper goes back to the 3,500-year-old "Nasadiya"verse of the Rig Veda, which meditates on the creation of theuniverse: "Who knows and who can say, whence it was born and whencecame this creation? The gods are later than this world's creation. Who knows then whence it first came into being?" When you have millions of gods, you cannot afford to be theologically narcissistic. It also makes you suspect power.
Both the Chinese and the Indians are convinced that their prosperity will only increase in the 21st century. In China it will be induced by the state; in India's case, it may well happen despite the state.
Indians expect to continue their relentless march toward a modern,democratic, market-based future. In this, terrorist attacks are anoisy, tragic, but ultimately futile sideshow.
However, Indians are painfully aware that they must reform their government bureaucracy, police and judiciary — institutions,paradoxically, they were so proud of a generation ago. When thathappens, India may become formidable, a thought that undoubtedlyworries China's leaders.
Gurcharan Das is the author of "India Unbound."
Thursday, October 23, 2008
** Tamils & LTTE:Update
Update:
UPA takes U-Turn @ http://www.dailypioneer.com/130172/UPA-takes-U-turn-on-Lanka-Tamils.html
---------------------------------------------------------------
Of Tamils and Tamil Tigers
Kalyani Shankar, Pioneer
The UPA Government is in a fix over the mounting clamour in Tamil Nadu for Delhi to stop Colombo from clobbering the LTTE. The Congress, no friend of the Tamil Tigers, could lose the DMK as an ally if it does not act. Yet it can’t be seen defending the Tigers.
Is the Government going to interfere in the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka or is it simply going through the motions to pacify its ally, the DMK, in Tamil Nadu? The reason for the concern is that the Sri Lankan military forces are carrying out a serious offensive against the LTTE and are said to be very close to Kilinochchi, the headquarters of the LTTE.
Lankan authorities are almost on the verge of breaking the banned LTTE and capture its leader V Prabhakaran. The Government stand makes it clear that while the matter is being taken up at the highest level, there may not be any major shift on the Sri Lankan policy because of its limited options.
Although the clashes between the armed forces and the Tamil Tigers have been going on for long, the Indian Government’s urgency to take up the issue with the Sri Lankan Government arose now because of the pressure from the ruling DMK in Tamil Nadu.
For the past week, a lively political drama was being enacted in the southern State. Chief Minister M Karunanidhi had gone to the extent of issuing an ultimatum to the Centre to put pressure on the Sri Lankan Government for a ceasefire, giving two weeks’ time which ends on October 29. However, the present indications are that he may not take any drastic measures to pull out from the UPA Government at the Centre.
Why have the political parties in Tamil Nadu taken up the Tamil issue now?
According to the UN, more than two lakh people have been displaced because of the military offensive in Sri Lanka.
This has led to the fear of a refugee inflow from the island nation. Political parties, including the DMK, PMK and MDMK, are concerned at the military action.
The critics of the DMK Government say that the ruling party wants to divert attention from the severe power crisis in the State. Others point out that elections are round the corner and the DMK wants to make a case for itself that it had taken up the cause of the Tamil people in Sri Lanka. It is also likely the party is anxious to distance itself from the UPA to keep its options open for a post-election realignment of political parties.
The Congress, without whose support the DMK Government in Tamil Nadu would fall, is playing its own game. To show solidarity with the Tamil people, Congress MPs had attended the all-party meeting convened by Mr Karunanidhi but did not resign from the Lok Sabha as demanded by the DMK chief.
The Congress cleverly took the stand that it was all for protecting the interests of the Tamils but it was certainly against the LTTE, thereby differentiating between the Tamils and the LTTE.
The Congress has to tread carefully because there is a warrant pending against LTTE chief Prabhakaran in the Rajiv Gandhi assassination case. On the other hand, local Congressmen are now keen to have a tie-up with the AIADMK. The Congress has in the past tied up both with the DMK and the AIADMK.
The dilemma facing the Centre is that New Delhi has been following a hands-off policy on Sri Lanka after the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi. Officially, India’s stand is that it wants a negotiated settlement within a united Sri Lanka, knowing that any fragmentation of that country could have serious consequences. Therefore, New Delhi cannot go beyond a point to put pressure on Colombo.
The Sri Lankan Government on its part is sending the President’s special envoy to New Delhi on October 26 while External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee may travel to Colombo later for further negotiations. However, these are mere signals. At the most, the Sri Lankan envoy may come up with a message that the military attack would be stopped if the LTTE gives up its arms and come for negotiations, but the LTTE is not ready to do so.
So where is the meeting point?
The Rajapaksa Government is determined to put down Prabhakaran now when the LTTE is weak and when the Government has an edge over the Tigers militarily. However, even if the military were to succeed in taking over Kilinochchi, Prabhakaran could flee with his followers to the dense forest. In addition, the locals may not support the military if they are still supporting the LTTE. While the Tigers are ready for an indefinite fight, the Sri Lankan Government will also worry about its international image if brutal military action is taken against LTTE.
Ultimately, the two sides should realise that a military solution is not desirable and a political solution alone would yield peace. For a political solution, both sides need to be a little more flexible. The LTTE should realise that its demand for an independent Tamil Eelam will never become a reality. The Sri Lankan Government, which shuns the idea of federalism, should be a little more flexible and offer a face-saving formula to the LTTE. Negotiations can begin only if there is readiness on their part and as of now, the Government has an upper hand.
Back in India, the Prime Minister has a difficult task. He not only has to deal with a foreign Government on a sensitive issue but also tackle the UPA partners in Tamil Nadu with kid gloves.
India has not forgotten the lessons of sending the IPKF to Sri Lanka. Above all, the political parties in Tamil Nadu should draw a line between Tamils and Tamil Tigers.
Related stories:
Deadly Triangle @ http://www.srilankawatch.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=172&Itemid=1
LTTE & Churches @ http://www.christianaggression.org/item_display.php?type=ARTICLES&id=1112887194
UPA takes U-Turn @ http://www.dailypioneer.com/130172/UPA-takes-U-turn-on-Lanka-Tamils.html
---------------------------------------------------------------
Of Tamils and Tamil Tigers
Kalyani Shankar, Pioneer
The UPA Government is in a fix over the mounting clamour in Tamil Nadu for Delhi to stop Colombo from clobbering the LTTE. The Congress, no friend of the Tamil Tigers, could lose the DMK as an ally if it does not act. Yet it can’t be seen defending the Tigers.
Is the Government going to interfere in the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka or is it simply going through the motions to pacify its ally, the DMK, in Tamil Nadu? The reason for the concern is that the Sri Lankan military forces are carrying out a serious offensive against the LTTE and are said to be very close to Kilinochchi, the headquarters of the LTTE.
Lankan authorities are almost on the verge of breaking the banned LTTE and capture its leader V Prabhakaran. The Government stand makes it clear that while the matter is being taken up at the highest level, there may not be any major shift on the Sri Lankan policy because of its limited options.
Although the clashes between the armed forces and the Tamil Tigers have been going on for long, the Indian Government’s urgency to take up the issue with the Sri Lankan Government arose now because of the pressure from the ruling DMK in Tamil Nadu.
For the past week, a lively political drama was being enacted in the southern State. Chief Minister M Karunanidhi had gone to the extent of issuing an ultimatum to the Centre to put pressure on the Sri Lankan Government for a ceasefire, giving two weeks’ time which ends on October 29. However, the present indications are that he may not take any drastic measures to pull out from the UPA Government at the Centre.
Why have the political parties in Tamil Nadu taken up the Tamil issue now?
According to the UN, more than two lakh people have been displaced because of the military offensive in Sri Lanka.
This has led to the fear of a refugee inflow from the island nation. Political parties, including the DMK, PMK and MDMK, are concerned at the military action.
The critics of the DMK Government say that the ruling party wants to divert attention from the severe power crisis in the State. Others point out that elections are round the corner and the DMK wants to make a case for itself that it had taken up the cause of the Tamil people in Sri Lanka. It is also likely the party is anxious to distance itself from the UPA to keep its options open for a post-election realignment of political parties.
The Congress, without whose support the DMK Government in Tamil Nadu would fall, is playing its own game. To show solidarity with the Tamil people, Congress MPs had attended the all-party meeting convened by Mr Karunanidhi but did not resign from the Lok Sabha as demanded by the DMK chief.
The Congress cleverly took the stand that it was all for protecting the interests of the Tamils but it was certainly against the LTTE, thereby differentiating between the Tamils and the LTTE.
The Congress has to tread carefully because there is a warrant pending against LTTE chief Prabhakaran in the Rajiv Gandhi assassination case. On the other hand, local Congressmen are now keen to have a tie-up with the AIADMK. The Congress has in the past tied up both with the DMK and the AIADMK.
The dilemma facing the Centre is that New Delhi has been following a hands-off policy on Sri Lanka after the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi. Officially, India’s stand is that it wants a negotiated settlement within a united Sri Lanka, knowing that any fragmentation of that country could have serious consequences. Therefore, New Delhi cannot go beyond a point to put pressure on Colombo.
The Sri Lankan Government on its part is sending the President’s special envoy to New Delhi on October 26 while External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee may travel to Colombo later for further negotiations. However, these are mere signals. At the most, the Sri Lankan envoy may come up with a message that the military attack would be stopped if the LTTE gives up its arms and come for negotiations, but the LTTE is not ready to do so.
So where is the meeting point?
The Rajapaksa Government is determined to put down Prabhakaran now when the LTTE is weak and when the Government has an edge over the Tigers militarily. However, even if the military were to succeed in taking over Kilinochchi, Prabhakaran could flee with his followers to the dense forest. In addition, the locals may not support the military if they are still supporting the LTTE. While the Tigers are ready for an indefinite fight, the Sri Lankan Government will also worry about its international image if brutal military action is taken against LTTE.
Ultimately, the two sides should realise that a military solution is not desirable and a political solution alone would yield peace. For a political solution, both sides need to be a little more flexible. The LTTE should realise that its demand for an independent Tamil Eelam will never become a reality. The Sri Lankan Government, which shuns the idea of federalism, should be a little more flexible and offer a face-saving formula to the LTTE. Negotiations can begin only if there is readiness on their part and as of now, the Government has an upper hand.
Back in India, the Prime Minister has a difficult task. He not only has to deal with a foreign Government on a sensitive issue but also tackle the UPA partners in Tamil Nadu with kid gloves.
India has not forgotten the lessons of sending the IPKF to Sri Lanka. Above all, the political parties in Tamil Nadu should draw a line between Tamils and Tamil Tigers.
Related stories:
Deadly Triangle @ http://www.srilankawatch.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=172&Itemid=1
LTTE & Churches @ http://www.christianaggression.org/item_display.php?type=ARTICLES&id=1112887194
Friday, April 25, 2008
** Revolution by intimidation
Revolution by intimidation
Brahma Chellaney
Having helped sow the wind in Nepal, India now will reap the Maoist whirlwind. New Delhi first ceded strategic space in Nepal to outside powers and the United Nations and then, in an intimidationplagued environment, encouraged a process that has sprung a nasty surprise.
Yet, no sooner than the Maoists triumphed in the elections, New Delhi’s after-the-fact rationalisations began.
Nepal is not just another neighbour but a symbiotically linked state with close cultural affinity and open borders with India that permit passport-free passage. The Indo-Nepal equation is deeper than between any two European Union members.
Indeed, ever since the 1950 Chinese annexation of Tibet eliminated the outer buffer, Nepal has served as an inner buffer between India and China.
The Maoist victory presents India with new potential challenges. It is likely to embolden other revolutionaries in the red corridor from Pashupati to Tirupati that the way to secure power is to wage unbridled violence until the established order gives in to a political and constitutional restructuring.
Equally significant is that India now will have to openly vie with China for influence in a state that had been its security preserve for more than half a century.
Maoist leader Prachanda’s pledge of “equidistance between India and China” despite Nepal’s 1950 security treaty with New Delhi underscores Beijing’s gain.
At a time when China is still battling a Tibetan uprising, the Nepal events arm it with additional leverage to dissuade New Delhi from playing the Tibet card.
It is karmic justice that the monarchy, which for long sought to play the China card against India, now faces extinction from the very forces—the Maoists—it initially helped rear to counter the India-friendly Nepali Congress.
Working with the guerrillas
The poll outcome raises the spectre that radicalisation could extend from the polity to the military, as the victors seek to integrate their former fighters into the security forces.
The Maoists’ stint in office, however, could help gradually defang them by making them indistinguishable from other politicians.
The new situation signals three likely developments.
First, Nepal’s rocky and troubled path to democracy since 1990 is unlikely to end, with the polls marking only the newest chapter in a blemished experiment.
Second, India’s relationship with Nepal is set to become more complicated, with little progress likely on addressing Indian security concerns or harnessing hydropower reserves for mutual benefit.
And third, the Maoists’ hard part comes now on the twin issues of governance and Constitution framing.
Those who sought to bring about a revolution by chipping away at state institutions are being called upon to reverse state atrophy. It won’t be easy for them to embrace what the situation demands — consensus building. If anything, they are likely to make India a convenient scapegoat for their failures in office.
Despite its proverbial aversion to hard decisions, India is left with no soft options. An openborder policy is sustainable only if India moves its security perimeter to the Nepalese frontier with Tibet. The onus must be placed on the Maoists to show through actions that the government they lead deserves sustained Indian aid, or else these revolutionaries will take Indian aid and also damn India.
New Delhi ought not to shy away from employing the immense leverage it holds: Nepal’s topography, with mountainous terrain sliding southward into plains, shapes its economic dependence on India. The ethnic Madhesis who populate the Terai, Nepal’s food bowl, are India’s natural constituency, and that card is begging to be exercised.
— The author is professor of strategic studies at the Centre for Policy Research. http://indiatoday.digitaltoday.in/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=7147&issueid=50
Brahma Chellaney
Having helped sow the wind in Nepal, India now will reap the Maoist whirlwind. New Delhi first ceded strategic space in Nepal to outside powers and the United Nations and then, in an intimidationplagued environment, encouraged a process that has sprung a nasty surprise.
Yet, no sooner than the Maoists triumphed in the elections, New Delhi’s after-the-fact rationalisations began.
Nepal is not just another neighbour but a symbiotically linked state with close cultural affinity and open borders with India that permit passport-free passage. The Indo-Nepal equation is deeper than between any two European Union members.
Indeed, ever since the 1950 Chinese annexation of Tibet eliminated the outer buffer, Nepal has served as an inner buffer between India and China.
The Maoist victory presents India with new potential challenges. It is likely to embolden other revolutionaries in the red corridor from Pashupati to Tirupati that the way to secure power is to wage unbridled violence until the established order gives in to a political and constitutional restructuring.
Equally significant is that India now will have to openly vie with China for influence in a state that had been its security preserve for more than half a century.
Maoist leader Prachanda’s pledge of “equidistance between India and China” despite Nepal’s 1950 security treaty with New Delhi underscores Beijing’s gain.
At a time when China is still battling a Tibetan uprising, the Nepal events arm it with additional leverage to dissuade New Delhi from playing the Tibet card.
It is karmic justice that the monarchy, which for long sought to play the China card against India, now faces extinction from the very forces—the Maoists—it initially helped rear to counter the India-friendly Nepali Congress.
Working with the guerrillas
The poll outcome raises the spectre that radicalisation could extend from the polity to the military, as the victors seek to integrate their former fighters into the security forces.
The Maoists’ stint in office, however, could help gradually defang them by making them indistinguishable from other politicians.
The new situation signals three likely developments.
First, Nepal’s rocky and troubled path to democracy since 1990 is unlikely to end, with the polls marking only the newest chapter in a blemished experiment.
Second, India’s relationship with Nepal is set to become more complicated, with little progress likely on addressing Indian security concerns or harnessing hydropower reserves for mutual benefit.
And third, the Maoists’ hard part comes now on the twin issues of governance and Constitution framing.
Those who sought to bring about a revolution by chipping away at state institutions are being called upon to reverse state atrophy. It won’t be easy for them to embrace what the situation demands — consensus building. If anything, they are likely to make India a convenient scapegoat for their failures in office.
Despite its proverbial aversion to hard decisions, India is left with no soft options. An openborder policy is sustainable only if India moves its security perimeter to the Nepalese frontier with Tibet. The onus must be placed on the Maoists to show through actions that the government they lead deserves sustained Indian aid, or else these revolutionaries will take Indian aid and also damn India.
New Delhi ought not to shy away from employing the immense leverage it holds: Nepal’s topography, with mountainous terrain sliding southward into plains, shapes its economic dependence on India. The ethnic Madhesis who populate the Terai, Nepal’s food bowl, are India’s natural constituency, and that card is begging to be exercised.
— The author is professor of strategic studies at the Centre for Policy Research. http://indiatoday.digitaltoday.in/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=7147&issueid=50
Thursday, March 27, 2008
** Sacrifice of Tibet
http://indiaview.wordpress.com/
The sacrifice of Tibet: Rediff
Rajeev Srinivasan
On November 18 every year, I silently salute the brave souls of C Company, 13th Kumaon Regiment, who in 1962 died practically to the last man and the last bullet defending Ladakh against the invading Chinese Army. These brave 114 inflicted heavy casualties and prevented the Chinese from overrunning Leh, much like Spartans at Thermopylae held the line against the invading Persians many moons ago.
But have you ever wondered why these brave men had to sacrifice themselves? One answer seems to be that is because of the extraordinary delusions that affected a number of the dramatis personae on the Indian side: notably Jawaharlal Nehru, KM Panikkar and VK Krishna Menon. A deadly combination of blind faith, gross megalomania, and groupthink led to the debacle in the war in1962; but its genesis lay in the unbelievable naivete that led these worthies to simply sacrifice a defenseless sister civilisation to brutal barbarians.
Furthermore, they were far more concerned about China’s interests than about India’s! Generations to come will scarcely believe that such criminal negligence was tolerated in the foreign policy of a major nation.
In a well-researched book, timed for the one hundredth anniversary of the opening of Tibet by the British, Claude Arpi, born in France but a long-term resident of India, and one of India’s leading Tibet and China experts, argues that India’s acquiescence to the enslavement of Tibet has had disastrous consequences.
The book is Born in Sin: The Panchsheel Agreement subtitled The Sacrifice of Tibet, published by Mittal Publications, New Delhi, 2004, pp. 241, Rs. 495, ISBN 81-7099-974-X. Unless otherwise noted, all of the quotations here are from this book.
Arpi also touches upon the difficulty scholars face with piecing together what actually happened in those momentous years leading to the extinction of Tibet and the India-China war of 1962, because the majority of the source materials are held as classified documents in the Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund or the Ministry of External Affairs.
The historian is forced to depend on the sanitised Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru and the restricted Official Report of the 1962 War.
If the relevant documents were made public at the very least we might learn something from them. Where is Aruna Roy, crusading champion of the people’s right to know who has now accepted a sinecure under the UPA? Why are the Nehru Papers controlled by Sonia Gandhi ?
The story really begins exactly one hundred years ago, in September 1904, when the British Colonel Francis Younghusband entered Tibet and forced the hitherto insular kingdom open at the point of a gun.
The Lhasa Convention of 1904, signed by the British and the Tibetans, put the seal of British overlordship over Tibet. The parallels with Commodore Perry of the US and his black ships opening up Japan are obvious.
However, unlike Japan, which under the Meiji Restoration took vigorously to westernisation, Tibet continued to distance itself from the outside world, much to its later disadvantage.
Perhaps we need to look further in history, as Arpi did in his earlier book, The Fate of Tibet: When Big Insects Eat Small Insects. The Tibetans were a feared, martial and warlike race that had always, in its impregnable mountain fastnesses, held the expansionist Han Chinese at bay. However, in the 7th century CE, Buddhism came to Tibet, and they became a pacifist nation.
Says Arpi: ‘Tibet’s conversion had another consequence on its political history: a nonviolent Tibet could no longer defend itself.
It had to look outside for military support to safeguard its frontiers and for the protection of its Dharma. This help came first from the Mongol Khans and later the Manchu Emperors when they became themselves followers of the Buddha’s doctrine.’
The sum and substance of China’s alleged historical claim to Tibet is this: that the Mongol Khans had conquered both China and Tibet at the same time. This is patently absurd, because by the same token India should claim Australia, New Zealand and Hong Kong as its own, because India and these territories were under British rule at the same time.
In fact, since the Mongol Khans and the Manchu Emperors accepted the Dalai Lama as their spiritual preceptor, it is clear that it was China that was giving tribute to Tibet, not vice versa: so Tibet could claim Han China as its vassal.
The Lhasa Convention was followed by the Simla Convention in 1914 that laid out the McMahon Line defining both the Indo-Tibetan border, and the division of Tibet into ‘Outer Tibet’ (which lies along the border with India) and ‘Inner Tibet’ which includes Amdo Province and part of Kham Province.
It is worthwhile to note that the Chinese were not invited to discuss the McMahon line, nor was their acceptance of this line sought. Tibetans signed this treaty as an independent nation. The British government emphasised this in a note to the Chinese as late as 1943: ‘Since the Chinese Revolution of 1911,… Tibet has enjoyed de facto independence.’
When India became independent, K M Panikkar wrote: ‘A China [organised as a Communist regime annexing Mongol, Muslim and Tibetan areas] will be in an extremely powerful position to claim its historic role of authority over Tibet, Burma, Indo-China and Siam. The historic claims in regard to these are vague and hazy’ Yet soon thereafter Panikkar became the principal spokesperson for China’s interests, even though his job was Indian Ambassador to China!
As soon as the Communists came to power, in 1950, they started asserting their claims: ‘The tasks for the People’s Liberation Army for 1950 are to liberate [sic] Taiwan, Hainan and Tibet.’ A Scottish missionary in Tibet said the PLA officers told him that once Tibet was in their hands, they would go to India.
On October 7, 1950, Mao Tse-Tung’s storm troopers invaded Tibet. But under Panikkar’s influence, Nehru felt that the loss of Tibet was worth the price of liberating Asia from ‘western dominance’. Panikkar said: ‘I do not think there is anything wrong in the troops of Red China moving about in their own country.’
Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel was one of the few in the Indian government who recognised the menace from China. He wrote:‘We also have to take note of a thoroughly unscrupulous, unreliable and determined power practically at our doors [It is clear that] we cannot be friendly with China and must think in terms of defense against a determined, calculating, unscrupulous, ruthless, unprincipled and prejudiced combination of powers, of which the Chinese will be the spearhead [It is obvious to me that] any friendly or appeasing approaches from us would either be mistaken for weakness or would be exploited in furtherance of their ultimate aim.’
How prophetic Patel was!
Unfortunately, he died soon after he wrote this. Interestingly, the very same words apply in their entirety to India’s dithering over Pakistan today, 54 years later. The Pakistanis are also exploiting India’s appeasement and friendliness.
But Nehru, it appears, had decided to sacrifice Tibet, partly in order to appease China, partly because of his distaste for what he considered ‘imperialist treaties’ (in this case the Lhasa Convention that gave enormous rights in Tibet to the British, and, as their successor, to the Indian government) and partly in order to act as mediator between China and the West over the Korean War.
Observers could see what was going to happen. The American ambassador Henderson noted: ‘The UK High Commission would like to be able to argue with Indian officials that if GoI bows to Communist China’s blackmail re Tibet, India will eventually be confronted with similar blackmail not only re Burma but re such areas as Assam, Bhutan, Sikkim, Kashmir, Nepal.’ Absolutely correct, for this is exactly what is happening today.
Nehru and Panikkar simply did not see the threat from China, so enamoured were they of the great Communist Revolution there. Nehru said: ‘The biggest event since the last War is the rise of Communist China’. Part of his admiration arose from his distaste for the Buddhist culture of Tibet: ‘We cannot support feudal elements in Tibet, indeed we cannot interfere in Tibet’.
Now doesn’t that sound exactly like Xinhua propaganda, which Nehru seems to have internalised?
A Canadian high commissioner had a different theory: ‘[Panikkar] had no illusions about the policies of the Chinese government and he had not been misled by it. He considered, however, that the future, at least in his lifetime, lay with the communists, and he therefore did his best to get on well with them by misleading Nehru’. That might be considered treason in certain circles.
Whatever the reason, we can see why Zhou-en Lai is rumored to have referred to the Indians in general and Nehru in particular as ‘useful idiots’.
(There is no reference to this in the Arpi book). In every discussion with Panikkar, the Chinese hosts smilingly avoided the question of settling the border, but they made sure that India acknowledged Chinese hegemony over Tibet.
The Indians were thoroughly outsmarted, partly because they were willing victims dazzled by the idea of Communism.
When confronted with the question of the undefined border, Nehru said, “All these are high mountains. Nobody lives there. It is not very necessary to define these things.” And in the context of whether the Chinese might invade India, here’s Nehru again: “What might happen is some petty trouble in the borders and unarmed infiltration. To some extent this can be stopped by checkposts.Ultimately, however, armies do not stop communist infiltration or communist ideas Any large expenditure on the army will starve the development of the country and social progress.”
The naivete leaves the neutral observer speechless.
What might be even more alarming is that there are supposedly serious Old Left analysts today, in 2004, who mouth these same inanities about not spending money on the Indian Army.
Why they do not take their cue from China, with its enormous Army, is mysterious, because in all other respects they expect India to emulate China. Except that is, no nukes, no military might for India.
By not asserting India’s treaty rights in Tibet, which would have helped Tibet remain as a neutral buffer zone, Nehru has hurt India very badly.
For, look at what is happening today. Nepal is under relentless attack by Maoists, almost certainly supported by Chinese money. Large parts of India are infested with violent Maoists. Much of West Bengal is under the iron grip of Marxists, who clearly take orders from Beijing.
It is in this context that the so-called Panchsheel Agreement was written. Given that the Indian side had a priori decided to surrender all its rights to the Chinese, in return for vague promises of brotherhood, it is perhaps the most vacuous treaty ever signed.
However, Nehru opined: “in my opinion, we have done no better thing than this since we became independent. I have no doubt about this I think it is right for our country, for Asia and for the world.”
Famous last words.
Nehru believed that the five principles which are referred to as Panchsheel were his personal, and major, contribution to world peace. Based on his impression of his stature in the world, he thought that the Panchsheel model could be used for treaties all over the world, and that it would lead to a tremendous breaking out of peace everywhere.
Nehru was sadly mistaken. There was nothing particularly remarkable about the principles themselves: they were not his invention, but were merely common-sense provisions used widely. And he had a megalomaniac idea of his own influence around the world: he did not realise that he cut a slightly comical figure. In his own mind, and in the minds of his toadies, he was the Emperor Ashoka returned, to bring about World Peace.
Here are the Five Principles:1. Mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty2. Mutual non-aggression3. Mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs4. Equality and mutual benefit5. Peaceful co-existence
The Chinese immediately violated every one of these principles, and have continued to do so happily. For instance, even while the treaty was being negotiated, the Chinese were building a road through Aksai Chin in Jammu and Kashmir, and in perhaps the most unbelievable aspect of this whole sorry mess, India was actually supplying rice to the Chinese troops building the road through Indian territory! This is distinctly surreal!
The problem was that Nehru had no sense of history. He should have read RC Majumdar: “There is, however, one aspect of Chinese culture that is little known outside the circle of professional historians It is characteristic of China that if a region once acknowledged her nominal suzerainty even for a short period, she would regard it as a part of her empire for ever and would automatically revive her claim over it even after a thousand years whenever there was a chance of enforcing it.”
And this was the ‘ally’ Nehru found against the ‘imperialists’ of the West!
He went so far as to decline a seat at the UN Security Council because the China seat was held by Taiwan. He did not want India to be in the Security Council until China was there too!
Since many people are curious about this, here is chapter and verse: it is in the Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Series II, Vol. 29, Minutes of meeting with Soviet Leaders, Moscow , 22 June 1955, pp. 231.
Here is the conversation between Nehru and Soviet Premier Marshal Bulganin:
“Bulganin: While we are discussing the general international situation and reducing tension, we propose suggesting at a later stage India’s inclusion as the sixth member of the Security Council.
Nehru: Perhaps Bulganin knows that some people in USA have suggested that India should replace China in the Security Council. This is to create trouble between us and China. We are, of course, wholly opposed to it. Further, we are opposed to pushing ourselves forward to occupy certain positions because that may itself create difficulties and India might itself become a subject of controversy. If India is to be admitted to the Security Council it raises the question of the revision of the Charter of the UN. We feel that this should not be done till the question of China’s admission and possibly of others is first solved. I feel that we should first concentrate on getting China admitted.”
The casual observer might wonder whether Nehru was India’s prime minister, or China’s.
Besides, the Chinese have now repaid all this support. India insisted that India should not be in the Security Council until China was in it, too. Now China insists that India should not be in the Security Council until Pakistan is in it, too. Seems fair, doesn’t it?
What is the net result of all this for India? It is a strategic disaster. Forget the fact that the Tibetan civilisation has been decimated, and it is an Indic civilisation with practically no relationship to Han Chinese civilisation. Strictly from India’s security perspective, it is an unmitigated catastrophe.
Analyst Ginsburg wrote in the fifties: ‘He who holds Tibet dominates the Himalayan piedmont; he who dominates the Himalayan piedmont, threatens the Indian subcontinent; and he who threatens the Indian subcontinent may well have all of Southeast Asia within his reach, and all of Asia.‘
Look at the situation in Tibet today.
The Chinese are planning the northward diversion of the Brahmaputra, also known as the Tsangpo. This would make North India a desert
The Chinese have on several occasions used ‘lake bombs’ to flood Indian territory: as the upper riparian state based on their occupation of Tibet, they are able to do this, for example on the Sutlej
Hu Jintao, who was the Butcher of Tibet, is now a top strongman in Beijing. Under his sponsorship, a railway line will be finished in 2007 linking Lhasa to eastern China. This would be an excellent mechanism for bringing in both largenumbers of Han immigrants to swamp the remaining Tibetan people, and also to deploy mobile nuclear missiles
The Chinese are deploying advanced nuclear missiles in Tibet, aimed at India, Russia and the US. With the railway line, they will be able to move these around and even conceal them quickly in tunnels and other locations
The Chinese dump large amounts of nuclear waste in Tibet, which will eventually make its way down to India via the rivers
The India-Tibet border is still not demarcated.
It is difficult to imagine a more disastrous foreign policy outcome than what happened between India and China. Claude Arpi is owed a debt of gratitude by all of us in India who care about the nation’s progress and even its survival.
If the rather well-thought-of founding prime minister of the country was so uncaring about India’s interests, one shudders to think what might be going on today with some of the ministers who are accused in criminal cases.
But even more than that, Arpi’s detailed analysis and painstaking research on the process through which Tibet was enslaved is an instructive case study in how barbarians are always at the gates, and how, as Will Durant said, ‘Civilisation is a precious good, whose delicate complex order and freedom can at any moment be overthrown by barbarians invading from without and multiplying from within’.
One of the profound lessons to be taken away is that it is the lack of respect for the spiritual that has led to this cataclysm. As Ministry of External Affairs observer, Apa Pant, pointed out about Tibet and the Han Chinese colonisation: ‘With all its shortcomings and discomforts, its inefficiencies and unconquered physical dangers, here was a civilisation with at least the intention of maintaining a pattern of life in which the individual could achieve liberation. The one so apparently inefficient, so human and even timid, yet kind and compassionate and aspiring to something more gloriously satisfying in human life; the other determined and effective, ruthless, power-hungry and finally intolerant…
In the corridors of power [in official India], Tibet, Buddhism, the Dalai Lama, were all regarded as ridiculous, too funny for words; useless illusions that would logically cease to exist soon, thanks to the Chinese, and good riddance.’
In the final analysis, Tibet was lost because those in power in India were dismissive of matters spiritual. It is the Empire of the Spirit that has made India what she has been all these millennia, and once the rulers start dismissing that, it is clear that we are in the Kali Yuga, the Dark Ages. It is the end of living, and the beginning of Survival.http://www.rediff.com/news/2008/mar/25rajeev.htm
TIBET: GLOBAL AMNESIA @ http://worldmonitor.wordpress.com/
The sacrifice of Tibet: Rediff
Rajeev Srinivasan
On November 18 every year, I silently salute the brave souls of C Company, 13th Kumaon Regiment, who in 1962 died practically to the last man and the last bullet defending Ladakh against the invading Chinese Army. These brave 114 inflicted heavy casualties and prevented the Chinese from overrunning Leh, much like Spartans at Thermopylae held the line against the invading Persians many moons ago.
But have you ever wondered why these brave men had to sacrifice themselves? One answer seems to be that is because of the extraordinary delusions that affected a number of the dramatis personae on the Indian side: notably Jawaharlal Nehru, KM Panikkar and VK Krishna Menon. A deadly combination of blind faith, gross megalomania, and groupthink led to the debacle in the war in1962; but its genesis lay in the unbelievable naivete that led these worthies to simply sacrifice a defenseless sister civilisation to brutal barbarians.
Furthermore, they were far more concerned about China’s interests than about India’s! Generations to come will scarcely believe that such criminal negligence was tolerated in the foreign policy of a major nation.
In a well-researched book, timed for the one hundredth anniversary of the opening of Tibet by the British, Claude Arpi, born in France but a long-term resident of India, and one of India’s leading Tibet and China experts, argues that India’s acquiescence to the enslavement of Tibet has had disastrous consequences.
The book is Born in Sin: The Panchsheel Agreement subtitled The Sacrifice of Tibet, published by Mittal Publications, New Delhi, 2004, pp. 241, Rs. 495, ISBN 81-7099-974-X. Unless otherwise noted, all of the quotations here are from this book.
Arpi also touches upon the difficulty scholars face with piecing together what actually happened in those momentous years leading to the extinction of Tibet and the India-China war of 1962, because the majority of the source materials are held as classified documents in the Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund or the Ministry of External Affairs.
The historian is forced to depend on the sanitised Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru and the restricted Official Report of the 1962 War.
If the relevant documents were made public at the very least we might learn something from them. Where is Aruna Roy, crusading champion of the people’s right to know who has now accepted a sinecure under the UPA? Why are the Nehru Papers controlled by Sonia Gandhi ?
The story really begins exactly one hundred years ago, in September 1904, when the British Colonel Francis Younghusband entered Tibet and forced the hitherto insular kingdom open at the point of a gun.
The Lhasa Convention of 1904, signed by the British and the Tibetans, put the seal of British overlordship over Tibet. The parallels with Commodore Perry of the US and his black ships opening up Japan are obvious.
However, unlike Japan, which under the Meiji Restoration took vigorously to westernisation, Tibet continued to distance itself from the outside world, much to its later disadvantage.
Perhaps we need to look further in history, as Arpi did in his earlier book, The Fate of Tibet: When Big Insects Eat Small Insects. The Tibetans were a feared, martial and warlike race that had always, in its impregnable mountain fastnesses, held the expansionist Han Chinese at bay. However, in the 7th century CE, Buddhism came to Tibet, and they became a pacifist nation.
Says Arpi: ‘Tibet’s conversion had another consequence on its political history: a nonviolent Tibet could no longer defend itself.
It had to look outside for military support to safeguard its frontiers and for the protection of its Dharma. This help came first from the Mongol Khans and later the Manchu Emperors when they became themselves followers of the Buddha’s doctrine.’
The sum and substance of China’s alleged historical claim to Tibet is this: that the Mongol Khans had conquered both China and Tibet at the same time. This is patently absurd, because by the same token India should claim Australia, New Zealand and Hong Kong as its own, because India and these territories were under British rule at the same time.
In fact, since the Mongol Khans and the Manchu Emperors accepted the Dalai Lama as their spiritual preceptor, it is clear that it was China that was giving tribute to Tibet, not vice versa: so Tibet could claim Han China as its vassal.
The Lhasa Convention was followed by the Simla Convention in 1914 that laid out the McMahon Line defining both the Indo-Tibetan border, and the division of Tibet into ‘Outer Tibet’ (which lies along the border with India) and ‘Inner Tibet’ which includes Amdo Province and part of Kham Province.
It is worthwhile to note that the Chinese were not invited to discuss the McMahon line, nor was their acceptance of this line sought. Tibetans signed this treaty as an independent nation. The British government emphasised this in a note to the Chinese as late as 1943: ‘Since the Chinese Revolution of 1911,… Tibet has enjoyed de facto independence.’
When India became independent, K M Panikkar wrote: ‘A China [organised as a Communist regime annexing Mongol, Muslim and Tibetan areas] will be in an extremely powerful position to claim its historic role of authority over Tibet, Burma, Indo-China and Siam. The historic claims in regard to these are vague and hazy’ Yet soon thereafter Panikkar became the principal spokesperson for China’s interests, even though his job was Indian Ambassador to China!
As soon as the Communists came to power, in 1950, they started asserting their claims: ‘The tasks for the People’s Liberation Army for 1950 are to liberate [sic] Taiwan, Hainan and Tibet.’ A Scottish missionary in Tibet said the PLA officers told him that once Tibet was in their hands, they would go to India.
On October 7, 1950, Mao Tse-Tung’s storm troopers invaded Tibet. But under Panikkar’s influence, Nehru felt that the loss of Tibet was worth the price of liberating Asia from ‘western dominance’. Panikkar said: ‘I do not think there is anything wrong in the troops of Red China moving about in their own country.’
Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel was one of the few in the Indian government who recognised the menace from China. He wrote:‘We also have to take note of a thoroughly unscrupulous, unreliable and determined power practically at our doors [It is clear that] we cannot be friendly with China and must think in terms of defense against a determined, calculating, unscrupulous, ruthless, unprincipled and prejudiced combination of powers, of which the Chinese will be the spearhead [It is obvious to me that] any friendly or appeasing approaches from us would either be mistaken for weakness or would be exploited in furtherance of their ultimate aim.’
How prophetic Patel was!
Unfortunately, he died soon after he wrote this. Interestingly, the very same words apply in their entirety to India’s dithering over Pakistan today, 54 years later. The Pakistanis are also exploiting India’s appeasement and friendliness.
But Nehru, it appears, had decided to sacrifice Tibet, partly in order to appease China, partly because of his distaste for what he considered ‘imperialist treaties’ (in this case the Lhasa Convention that gave enormous rights in Tibet to the British, and, as their successor, to the Indian government) and partly in order to act as mediator between China and the West over the Korean War.
Observers could see what was going to happen. The American ambassador Henderson noted: ‘The UK High Commission would like to be able to argue with Indian officials that if GoI bows to Communist China’s blackmail re Tibet, India will eventually be confronted with similar blackmail not only re Burma but re such areas as Assam, Bhutan, Sikkim, Kashmir, Nepal.’ Absolutely correct, for this is exactly what is happening today.
Nehru and Panikkar simply did not see the threat from China, so enamoured were they of the great Communist Revolution there. Nehru said: ‘The biggest event since the last War is the rise of Communist China’. Part of his admiration arose from his distaste for the Buddhist culture of Tibet: ‘We cannot support feudal elements in Tibet, indeed we cannot interfere in Tibet’.
Now doesn’t that sound exactly like Xinhua propaganda, which Nehru seems to have internalised?
A Canadian high commissioner had a different theory: ‘[Panikkar] had no illusions about the policies of the Chinese government and he had not been misled by it. He considered, however, that the future, at least in his lifetime, lay with the communists, and he therefore did his best to get on well with them by misleading Nehru’. That might be considered treason in certain circles.
Whatever the reason, we can see why Zhou-en Lai is rumored to have referred to the Indians in general and Nehru in particular as ‘useful idiots’.
(There is no reference to this in the Arpi book). In every discussion with Panikkar, the Chinese hosts smilingly avoided the question of settling the border, but they made sure that India acknowledged Chinese hegemony over Tibet.
The Indians were thoroughly outsmarted, partly because they were willing victims dazzled by the idea of Communism.
When confronted with the question of the undefined border, Nehru said, “All these are high mountains. Nobody lives there. It is not very necessary to define these things.” And in the context of whether the Chinese might invade India, here’s Nehru again: “What might happen is some petty trouble in the borders and unarmed infiltration. To some extent this can be stopped by checkposts.Ultimately, however, armies do not stop communist infiltration or communist ideas Any large expenditure on the army will starve the development of the country and social progress.”
The naivete leaves the neutral observer speechless.
What might be even more alarming is that there are supposedly serious Old Left analysts today, in 2004, who mouth these same inanities about not spending money on the Indian Army.
Why they do not take their cue from China, with its enormous Army, is mysterious, because in all other respects they expect India to emulate China. Except that is, no nukes, no military might for India.
By not asserting India’s treaty rights in Tibet, which would have helped Tibet remain as a neutral buffer zone, Nehru has hurt India very badly.
For, look at what is happening today. Nepal is under relentless attack by Maoists, almost certainly supported by Chinese money. Large parts of India are infested with violent Maoists. Much of West Bengal is under the iron grip of Marxists, who clearly take orders from Beijing.
It is in this context that the so-called Panchsheel Agreement was written. Given that the Indian side had a priori decided to surrender all its rights to the Chinese, in return for vague promises of brotherhood, it is perhaps the most vacuous treaty ever signed.
However, Nehru opined: “in my opinion, we have done no better thing than this since we became independent. I have no doubt about this I think it is right for our country, for Asia and for the world.”
Famous last words.
Nehru believed that the five principles which are referred to as Panchsheel were his personal, and major, contribution to world peace. Based on his impression of his stature in the world, he thought that the Panchsheel model could be used for treaties all over the world, and that it would lead to a tremendous breaking out of peace everywhere.
Nehru was sadly mistaken. There was nothing particularly remarkable about the principles themselves: they were not his invention, but were merely common-sense provisions used widely. And he had a megalomaniac idea of his own influence around the world: he did not realise that he cut a slightly comical figure. In his own mind, and in the minds of his toadies, he was the Emperor Ashoka returned, to bring about World Peace.
Here are the Five Principles:1. Mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty2. Mutual non-aggression3. Mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs4. Equality and mutual benefit5. Peaceful co-existence
The Chinese immediately violated every one of these principles, and have continued to do so happily. For instance, even while the treaty was being negotiated, the Chinese were building a road through Aksai Chin in Jammu and Kashmir, and in perhaps the most unbelievable aspect of this whole sorry mess, India was actually supplying rice to the Chinese troops building the road through Indian territory! This is distinctly surreal!
The problem was that Nehru had no sense of history. He should have read RC Majumdar: “There is, however, one aspect of Chinese culture that is little known outside the circle of professional historians It is characteristic of China that if a region once acknowledged her nominal suzerainty even for a short period, she would regard it as a part of her empire for ever and would automatically revive her claim over it even after a thousand years whenever there was a chance of enforcing it.”
And this was the ‘ally’ Nehru found against the ‘imperialists’ of the West!
He went so far as to decline a seat at the UN Security Council because the China seat was held by Taiwan. He did not want India to be in the Security Council until China was there too!
Since many people are curious about this, here is chapter and verse: it is in the Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Series II, Vol. 29, Minutes of meeting with Soviet Leaders, Moscow , 22 June 1955, pp. 231.
Here is the conversation between Nehru and Soviet Premier Marshal Bulganin:
“Bulganin: While we are discussing the general international situation and reducing tension, we propose suggesting at a later stage India’s inclusion as the sixth member of the Security Council.
Nehru: Perhaps Bulganin knows that some people in USA have suggested that India should replace China in the Security Council. This is to create trouble between us and China. We are, of course, wholly opposed to it. Further, we are opposed to pushing ourselves forward to occupy certain positions because that may itself create difficulties and India might itself become a subject of controversy. If India is to be admitted to the Security Council it raises the question of the revision of the Charter of the UN. We feel that this should not be done till the question of China’s admission and possibly of others is first solved. I feel that we should first concentrate on getting China admitted.”
The casual observer might wonder whether Nehru was India’s prime minister, or China’s.
Besides, the Chinese have now repaid all this support. India insisted that India should not be in the Security Council until China was in it, too. Now China insists that India should not be in the Security Council until Pakistan is in it, too. Seems fair, doesn’t it?
What is the net result of all this for India? It is a strategic disaster. Forget the fact that the Tibetan civilisation has been decimated, and it is an Indic civilisation with practically no relationship to Han Chinese civilisation. Strictly from India’s security perspective, it is an unmitigated catastrophe.
Analyst Ginsburg wrote in the fifties: ‘He who holds Tibet dominates the Himalayan piedmont; he who dominates the Himalayan piedmont, threatens the Indian subcontinent; and he who threatens the Indian subcontinent may well have all of Southeast Asia within his reach, and all of Asia.‘
Look at the situation in Tibet today.
The Chinese are planning the northward diversion of the Brahmaputra, also known as the Tsangpo. This would make North India a desert
The Chinese have on several occasions used ‘lake bombs’ to flood Indian territory: as the upper riparian state based on their occupation of Tibet, they are able to do this, for example on the Sutlej
Hu Jintao, who was the Butcher of Tibet, is now a top strongman in Beijing. Under his sponsorship, a railway line will be finished in 2007 linking Lhasa to eastern China. This would be an excellent mechanism for bringing in both largenumbers of Han immigrants to swamp the remaining Tibetan people, and also to deploy mobile nuclear missiles
The Chinese are deploying advanced nuclear missiles in Tibet, aimed at India, Russia and the US. With the railway line, they will be able to move these around and even conceal them quickly in tunnels and other locations
The Chinese dump large amounts of nuclear waste in Tibet, which will eventually make its way down to India via the rivers
The India-Tibet border is still not demarcated.
It is difficult to imagine a more disastrous foreign policy outcome than what happened between India and China. Claude Arpi is owed a debt of gratitude by all of us in India who care about the nation’s progress and even its survival.
If the rather well-thought-of founding prime minister of the country was so uncaring about India’s interests, one shudders to think what might be going on today with some of the ministers who are accused in criminal cases.
But even more than that, Arpi’s detailed analysis and painstaking research on the process through which Tibet was enslaved is an instructive case study in how barbarians are always at the gates, and how, as Will Durant said, ‘Civilisation is a precious good, whose delicate complex order and freedom can at any moment be overthrown by barbarians invading from without and multiplying from within’.
One of the profound lessons to be taken away is that it is the lack of respect for the spiritual that has led to this cataclysm. As Ministry of External Affairs observer, Apa Pant, pointed out about Tibet and the Han Chinese colonisation: ‘With all its shortcomings and discomforts, its inefficiencies and unconquered physical dangers, here was a civilisation with at least the intention of maintaining a pattern of life in which the individual could achieve liberation. The one so apparently inefficient, so human and even timid, yet kind and compassionate and aspiring to something more gloriously satisfying in human life; the other determined and effective, ruthless, power-hungry and finally intolerant…
In the corridors of power [in official India], Tibet, Buddhism, the Dalai Lama, were all regarded as ridiculous, too funny for words; useless illusions that would logically cease to exist soon, thanks to the Chinese, and good riddance.’
In the final analysis, Tibet was lost because those in power in India were dismissive of matters spiritual. It is the Empire of the Spirit that has made India what she has been all these millennia, and once the rulers start dismissing that, it is clear that we are in the Kali Yuga, the Dark Ages. It is the end of living, and the beginning of Survival.http://www.rediff.com/news/2008/mar/25rajeev.htm
TIBET: GLOBAL AMNESIA @ http://worldmonitor.wordpress.com/
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